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Abstract: Soeharto treated Indonesian Muslim 
Communities with two different ways. On the one side, he 
has given them full freedom to conduct Islamic rituals such 
as prayers, almsgivings, fasting during Ramadhan, pilgrim 
and so on. On the other side, however, he has not given 
them full freedom to exercise politics at the practical level 
because it would raise problems in the long run. He 
handled their political activities tightly. Therefore he put 
whatever efforts necessary to safeguard his power interests 
such as launching Pancasila as the sole basis (asas tunggal) 
for all political parties and mass organizations, merging 
four Islamic political parties into one party, PPP and so on. 
After more than 30 years he conducted the politicization of 
Islam, the big mutiny and turbulences happened 
everywhere which was supported by all university students 
and caused the fall of his power in 1998 with sad ending 
and Indonesian reform era started.  
Keywords: Soeharto, Indonesian Islam, New Order, 
politics. 
Introduction 
In the history of Indonesian politics, Christian Snouck Hurgronje, 
Soekarno and Soeharto have applied Ali Abdul Raziq’s notion of 
secularism. Even in the New Order regime, President Soeharto 
handled Islamic affairs in the country based on the separation between 
religion and politics. The main reason of the two former Indonesian 
Presidents taking the decision was experience of the politics apparently 
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weakened, the role of its religious and social dimensions has developed 
and flourished from time to time until today.1  
The Indonesian development has shown a paradoxical implement-
tation of models of the development between liberal model of Talcott 
Parsons and conservative model of Huntington. In the Parsons 
Paradigm, development means the change of social and economic 
structure and shift from a traditional system to a modern one that may 
result in social mobilization, development, while in the Huntington 
paradigm, development becomes a combination of modernity and 
tradition with an effective government.2  
The first paradox is that national development in Indonesia has, to 
some extent, adopted elements of a liberal development by the 
creation of modern forms of social and economic structures, yet in the 
meantime reviving classical indigenous traditions. The second paradox 
lay in the fact of economic liberalisation at the cost of strong political 
control. 
Strong evidence of that kind of development is to be found in the 
two different directions of structural transformation that occurred in 
the economic field and the political one respectively. Structural 
transformation in the economy has already seen a shift of the income 
of society from agriculture sector in the agro industry, industry in 
profit sectors. 
The change of civic polities, on the other hand, indicated structural 
transformation in polity by praetorians. According to Huntington, the 
civic polity is a type of politics in which one or more independent 
political forces dominate social spheres, whereas praetorian power of a 
government is that which is not controlled by the political parties.3 The 
latter term might not fit in to Indonesian politics very well, but some 
elements of praetorianism were discernible in the New Order 
government, such as the absence of an independent effective political 
force, the strength of bureaucracy in decision-making process, and its 
expansion and interference into almost all social spheres. 
                                                 
1 Victor Tanja, HMI: Sejarah dan Kedudukannya di Tengah-tengah Gerakan Muslim 
Pembaharu di Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1982), p. 142. 
2 See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and 
London: n.p., 1968), pp. 80-83. 
3 R. William Liddle, “Soeharto’s Indonesia, Personal Rule and Political Institution,” in 
Pacific Affairs, No. 58 (1985): pp. 68-90. 
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In relation to the “ideology” of development, a praetorianistic 
polity has, of course, a political logic of its own, such as an argument 
for the necessity of national stability for the success and sustainability 
of development itself. The accentuation of national stability has been 
the characteristics of the New Order’s political engineering. Political 
institutionalization in this respect is reflected in the security and 
monolithic approaches exercised by the New Order government. As a 
consequence, the degree of political participation has been weakened, 
particularly because political parties, as vehicles of political expression, 
were not able to articulate the political interest of the people. 
The political institutionalization achieved thus has not encouraged 
people’s political participation, because the institutionalization process 
only strengthened what Liddle has called the “New Order Pyramid”.4 
This pyramid consists of a dominant presidency, which becomes the 
centre of decision-making, and pattern of state society relationship that 
combines co-option and response with repression. 
According to Liddle, the mechanism of the New Order political 
structure departs from the presidency at the top, giving commands to 
the military which is the most important element of the bureaucracy 
and, in turn, exercises power over society. The whole process of 
political engineering has effectively created a relatively stable condition 
of the relationship between state and society, or between the ruler and 
the ruled. 
It is in such a political setting that the de-politicization of Islam has 
been processed. The manner of the process took the form of getting 
rid Islamic symbols for political activities, eliminating Islamic political 
parties, and clearing the political arena of Muslim politicians. The de-
politicization of Islam has reached its culmination in terms of political 
vehicle in the amalgamation of all existing Islamic political parties into 
United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP) in 
1973, and in terms of political ideology in the obligation to adopt 
Pancasila as the asas tunggal (the sole basis) by all political parties and 
mass organizations in 1985.  
The de-politicization of Islam was part of a broader scheme, 
namely the de-politicization of the people in general. This was seen in 
the creation of a floating mass population which de-politicized people 
at the grass-roots level and alienated political leaders from their 
                                                 
4 Nasir Tamara, “Islam under the New Order: A Political History,” in Prisma (English 
Edition), No. 49, (June 1990), p. 14. 
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followers. The streamlining of political parties followed this in to 
Golongan Karya (Golkar), the PPP, and the Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia (PDI). Islamic political parties responded in a relatively 
“easy“ way toward this streamlining, though the story behind the 
creation of the PPP is not simple, as Nasir Tamara maintains.5 
From the beginning, NU was the largest member among Muslim-
based political parties. Although initially not very keen on merging, 
NU eventually joined into the fusion without internal conflict. On the 
other hand, there was unrest within Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 
(PSII) resulting in a leadership change, which was won by pro-merger 
people. On the other hand, Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi) and 
Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti) supported a quick merger from 
the start.6 This “easy and quick response“ was due in part to the 
situational logic of politics at that time that led political parties to 
follow the current of political engineering, and in part to an “intrinsic 
competition” among Islamic political groups to be seen as the first 
supporter of the regime. 
Escaping from the obligation not to include any mention of Islam 
in the new party’s name, Muslim leaders have chosen the terms 
persatuan (unity) and pembangunan (development). They hoped by so 
doing not to delete some mention of Islam, because the term persatuan 
indicates one of the most important principles of Islam. They also 
hoped that the amalgamation would provide them with Hikmah 
(blessings in disguise) and to establish ukhuwah Islamiyah (Islamic 
brotherhood). The adoption of the term pembangunan was perceived as 
agreement with and support for the New Order’s policy of 
development. It is possible that the use of the terms persatuan and 
pembangunan was meant to convey a message that the PPP, the 
“Islamic” party, had emerged to gain the support from the Muslim 
community in order to participate in the national development process. 
It is notable that Muslims’ responses to the political change during 
the first ten years of the New Order (1996-1976) which, in relation to 
the agenda for the de-politicization of Islam, might be identified as a 
“period of conditioning” that appeared more political in nature, 
although with critical accommodation. Little intellectual response was 
shown, such as elaboration on the relationship between Islam and the 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 15. 
6 Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order” Modernization in 
Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1980), p. 78-116. 
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state, the Pancasila, and politics with the exception of the 
accommodationist responses of Mintaredja and Nurcholish Madjid.7  
Mintaredja (the-then chairman of Parmusi and later President of 
the PPP) in his reflection on Islam and the Pancasila considered that 
Islam does not aim at the creation of an Islamic state because during 
the time of Prophet Muhammad, the term “state” in today’s sense of 
the state was not yet in existence.8 In the Mintaredja’s view, the major 
duty of Muslims is to struggle for creating a true Muslim society which 
should be distinguished from an Islamic state. A Muslim society could 
legitimately exist in a state without undermining its integrity as the 
nation-state.9 Concerning the relationship between Islam and politics, 
Mintaredja believed in the totalistic character of Islam as a way of life, 
including political life. He maintained that politics is worldly in nature 
and an approach to political issues should be in accordance with its 
nature. 
Similar to Mintaredja’s idea as mentioned above, Nurcholish 
Madjid has promoted a slogan popularly on the eve of the 1970’s as 
“Islam-Yes, Islamic party-No“. This slogan lately became one of the 
main points of this “his renewal project“ which was severely criticised 
and resisted by many Muslims.10 Having observed the problems of 
Indonesia Islam, which lay in the paradox between the defeat of 
politicised Islam and its rapid expansion, Nurcholish Madjid came to 
the conclusion that Islam’s quantitative growth was not encouraged by 
the Islamic parties or Islam organizations, for the Islamic parties had 
failed to build a positive and sympathetic image of Islam.11 
According to Munawir Sjadzali, in certain circumstances, the 
absence of the Islamic political parties was better for Muslims. The 
experiences of national life in the past few years clearly showed that 
the interests of Muslim ummah were even well taken care of when there 
was no Muslim party in the Indonesian political sphere, he said.12 
                                                 
7 H. M. S. Mintaredja, Renungan Pembaharuan Pemikiran: Masyarakat Islam dan Politik di 
Indonesia (Jakarta: Permata, 1971), p. 77. 
8 Ibid., p. 78. 
9 For more detailed in this account, see Nurcholish Madjid, “Keharusan Pembaharuan 
Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Ummat,” in Nurcholish Madjid, et al., 
Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam (Jakarta: Islamic Research Centre, 1970), pp. 1-12. 
10 Ibid. 
11 H. Munawir Sjadzali, Muslim’s Interests are Better Served in The Absence of Muslim Parties, 
Indonesia Experience (Jakarta: Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1992), p. 2. 
12 Ibid., p. 3. 
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From the start of the New Order, especially in the last decade, many 
expectations of Muslim for the improvement of religious infrastructure 
and facilities have been sufficiently met. In the past, at the time when 
Muslim parties were present, the same expectations had never been 
fulfilled. The following examples could be advanced. 
In the field of law, for instance, with the passing of law Number 14 
of 1970 on judicial Authority, the existence of the Law of Religious 
Court (Islamic Court) is fully recognized as an independent law court 
and equal to the other three Courts of law: Public Court, 
Administrative Court, and Military Court. This law was then followed 
by the enactment of law No. 7 of 1989 on Religious Court, some of 
which had prevailed for more than 100 years, and at the same time 
served as the realization of the stipulation contained in law No. 14 of 
1970 on the independence of the Religious Court, to the other three 
laws.13 
In this context, it should be noted that in 1948, a Muslim party 
brought up a proposal for the improvement of religious court status to 
KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, or the Indonesian National 
Central Committee) which, at that time, served as provisional 
parliament, but the proposal met with strong opposition from other 
parties or factions and, being a minority group at the time, the party 
could do nothing about it.14 
In regards to the development of law, up to the year 1991, religious 
judges had no standardized books of law similar to the KUHP (Kitab 
Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, or the Penal Code) for judges in the 
Public Court, even though the Religious Court had been established 
long before; the religious judges had to resort to numerous yet diverse 
reference of fiqh books in dealing with the legal issues brought up by 
members of the community. As a result, it often happened that they 
were two similar cases, headed by two different judges with two 
different books of reference, would result in two different verdicts, 
which meant that there was no legal certainty. 
The peculiar situation ended, once again, at the time of the New 
Order, in the absence of Muslim parties, with the issuance of a joint-
decree of the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of 
Religious Affairs on the establishment of an Islamic Law Compilation 
                                                 
13 Madjid, “Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam, p. 15. 
14 Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Strategy for the 
Indonesia Middle Class,” Indonesia, October (1993), p. 11. 
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Project (Kompilasi Hukum Islam/KHI). In December 1987, the 
project succeeded in completing three draft books as legal references 
to be used by the religious judges throughout Indonesia. The first 
book is on marriage, the second one is about the law of inheritance, 
and the third one on waqf (religious endowment). By the presidential 
instruction No. 1 of 1991, issued on June 10, 1991 just one week 
before the President and his family made a pilgrim to Makkah, those 
three books were officially put into effect and ordered to be publicly 
used.15 
In the field of education, Indonesia has the law Number 2 of 1989 
on National Education System, in which religious education is 
affirmed as a sub-system to the National Education System, and 
religious instruction is compulsory at all public schools and 
universities. The law also reaffirmed recognition to the long existing 
religious education institutions in conformity with the claim of the 
New Order that the state which, is based on Pancasila is neither a 
theocratic nor a secular state. 
In the relation to houses of worship there has been a sharp 
increase in the number of mosques and mushalla including over 500 
strong and beautiful mosques built by the Yayasan Amal Bhakti 
Muslim Pancasila (Muslim Charity Foundation) Chaired by President 
Soeharto.16 
In the realm of dakwah (Islamic propagation), it is well known that 
the major weakness of socio-Islamic organizations is a serious lack of 
financial back up. An international Islamic organization once promised 
to help the financing of 1000 preachers for the whole country. 
However, the realization was only for 300 preachers, far below the 
target, and later the number went down to just a little more than 100.17 
To cope with that unfavourable situation and being fully aware of the 
urgency for religious guidance in the remote and isolated areas 
especially in the transmigration locations President Soeharto urged the 
MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, or The Indonesian Council of Ulama) 
to prepare 1000 da’i (preachers) for religious duties in transmigration 
sites. They would receive Rp. 100.000 per month for the period of 
three years as financial support from the Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim 
Pancasila. The same foundation has also donated financial support for 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 15. 
16 Ibid., p. 11. 
17 Ibid. 
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other 1000 imams for transmigration sites channelled through the 
MDI (Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah, or The Council for Islamic 
Preaching).18  
During the Old Order regime under President Soekarno and still 
more so under the Soeharto’s New Order regime, the Indonesian 
government was directly or indirectly involved in the construction of 
many mosques and the development of public institutions of Islamic 
religious education, from the primary school to the higher education 
such as IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, or The State Institute for 
Islamic Studies).19 The New Order regime, on other hand, has started 
for the de-politicization of Islam which was primarily materialized by 
the ban on political parties based exclusively on Islam or its 
particularities; it favoured the development of Islamic values in the 
social, cultural and intellectual spheres of life, in order to create the so-
called “ethical” basis of national development. 
Up to present time, Islam often functions as a source of 
motivation for demands of adjustment of different aspects of 
government policy. In the demands, the Islamic motive is generally 
combined with other reasons and motives, of a cultural, social, 
economic or political motif. An example is the movement for the 
democratization of the political system which has been growing for 
some years now. Its background is partly based on Islamic values, legal 
notions and organization. 
The Islamic element was still more prominent in the recent 
campaign for the abolition of the SDSB (Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial 
Berhadiah, or social philanthropically Contribution with Prizes) lottery, 
in which formal arguments about Islamic law were combined with the 
denunciation of growing social and economic disparities. The latter 
campaign finally attained its goal on November 25, 1993, when the 
Minister of Social Affairs announced the discontinuation of the 
lottery.20 However, at present Islam is seldom a source of criticism of 
the political system or the public authorities as a whole in the country. 
The democratic tradition that can accord respect to diversity was 
tough at practical level. The politics of concentration of power and the 
policy of incorporation in operation since long should be reviewed. 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 18. 
19 Graha Insan Cita, Pidato Ketua Umum PB HMI pada Dies Natalis ke 51 (Depok 
February 5, 1998), p. 7. 
20 Ibid., p. 8. 
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Indeed, the politics of concentration is not only irrelevant to the 
democratic tradition, but is also contrary to the heterogeneous social 
nature of the Indonesian people. The motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika or 
Unity in Diversity is a cultural treasure of the Indonesian people which 
is quite relevant to be practiced in real practical life. The selection of 
public service officials should have represented and respected this 
pluralistic society.  
The strong demand for democracy and healthy political activity has 
forced the government to review political life, together with the 
legislative institutions to review the rules of political game. From time 
to time the people’s awareness towards their rights as citizens has 
increased, including right to politics and implementation of the clean 
government by the New Order administration. 
In the last years of Soeharto administration, the political dynamics 
in the country has increased. After short period of decline following 
the repression of the Megawati supporters on 27 July 1996, a surge of 
democratic waves appeared throughout the archipelago.21 Reminiscent 
of the last days of Soekarno, the current democracy movements have 
been championed by the university students who launched their 
protest in response to the government which was seen as being 
incapable of controlling the crisis and its negative impacts on the life 
of the people. 
The politics of de-politicization of Soeharto consists of two 
strategies; direct and indirect one. The first has targeted to the rural 
masses, which constitute bulk of Indonesian population    
(approximately 70 percent). It has taken the form of the so-called 
“floating mass” policy, the purpose of which is to limit the activities of 
political parties as far as the district level. The underlying assumption 
of the particular policy is to protect people from political manipulation 
by competing parties, which had occurred in the past and engendered 
political instability and promoted social disturbance. 
The second strategy, namely the indirect strategy of de-
politicization has been implemented through various mechanisms, 
most important of which were the state’s corporatization, co-optation, 
and ideological hegemony. Through the corporatist mechanism, the 
state is able to put forth systematic control and surveillance over the 
                                                 
21 HM Yusuf (ed.), 50 Tahun HMI Mengabdi Republik (Jakarta: LASPI, 1977), p. 132. 
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existing interest groups in society through direct intervention in their 
existing organizations. 
According to the Lt. General (ret.) Rudini,22 the rise of the people’s 
political awareness should be accompanied also with the rise of the 
government’s role and socio-political structure. It was quite important 
in order to meet the development demands, their aspirations and 
aggregation of people’s political interest could be developed to become 
“affirmation potential” for sustained national development, not just 
“trouble-maker potential” which hampers national integration. 
Accordingly, the role of ABRI, political parties, Golkar and all the 
existing mass organizations, including youth organizations, should be 
enhanced maximally so that they could participate to increase the 
national awareness and to boost national unity in order to realize the 
national ideals based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. 
As custodians of people’s aspirations all political parties and 
Golkar were expected to participate actively in enhancing the quality of 
development and democracy. In this context, the role of political 
institutions should be maximized. All socio-political forces in the 
country should work to prepare the people qualified for development 
and capable of channelling the socio-political aspirations of the grass-
roots; they are expected to serve the interest of the society, the nation 
and the state properly and consistently. Unfortunately, these political 
parties, particularly the Golkar as ruling party was regarded as a 
political vehicle by its leaders for their self-interest, their families and 
their cronies. 
The role of mass organizations as medium to articulate the 
people’s interest should be advocated and supported continuously. The 
rise of all social institutions, including youth organizations is quite 
helpful to enhance the quality of political awareness in support of 
national unity and integration for better civilized Indonesian people in 
the future.23 Due to secular education which was neutral towards 
religions, they became alienated from Islam. They tended to ignore the 
Islamic doctrine and the Shari’ah (Islamic Law). More than that, the 
secular educational system created friction among the Muslim youth 
between those who ignored and those who obeyed the Islamic 
doctrine. Above all, because in Java island could be found the tendency 
                                                 
22 Ibid., pp. 132-133. 
23 A Komaruddin and  M Fauzie, HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman (Jakarta: KAHMI, 
1990), p. 136. 
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of religious assimilation, their presence in the secular education 
affected to deeper friction between the “heterodox” Muslim group and 
those who aspired to purify the Shari’ah (Islamic Law) from all kind of 
derivations. 
In order to overcome the above problems, Deliar Noer has come 
up with an idea to develop nationalism based on the deepest religious 
heritage. Noer believes that a nation which has identied itself with the 
religion of its majority population is a basic key for national unity and 
integration. Therefore, the Indonesian strength lays in its identification 
with Islam, and only Muslim which hardly endeavoured to develop the 
Islamic basis of nation potential become “the ulama-intellectual and the 
intellectual-ulama“.24 
The above formulation placed the enhancement of faith and 
devotion to the one only God as the top priority in the national 
education objective. It was indicated that religious education in secular 
higher education should get the man concern, the fact of the 
seriousness is the ongoing perfection of the Islamic religious subjects 
in the secular higher education. 
After long time the religious subject was given in the conventional 
way, and today in the secular universities, the Islamic concept of any 
discipline (IDI) was already taught. This indication is one step ahead 
with relating the process of science and technology to Islamisation. 
Besides, it has developed many ways to delve deeply into Islamic 
doctrine in various fields like economics, politics, culture, etc. 
One the other side, the New Order administration policies 
generally weakened all Islamic university student organizations. Since 
its establishment, the New Order government engaged in bringing 
about economic development and repressing all political opponents 
and mass and religious organizations. This phenomenon is not peculiar 
to neo-fascists, not only in Indonesia, but it was also common to 
several third world countries like Brazil, Argentina and Iran under Syah 
Reza Pahlevi.25  
Meanwhile, there is also a group who entered the system. This 
group called institutionalist, which struggled from within the structure. 
Some of them succeeded in supporting the processes of change from 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Adi Sasono is ex-activist of Bandung branch HMI. Since May 1998 President B. J. 
Habibie appointed him as minister economic, co-operative and weak entrepreneurship 
development. 
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within the structure. However there was a group disinclined to 
motivating the change process from within. Beside that, there was 
professionalist group which was neutral towards the political system. 
They tended to work related to the justice aspect, even distribution and 
freedom. They have given contribution, but their activities have not 
influenced to the wider community. They worked sectorally in their 
own field. 
Therefore, a novel idea was needed to resume their activities and 
responsibilities based on professionalism. They did not need to do 
dichotomy between those worked in the state institutions and outside 
of it. But, they should develop togetherness in order to realize the 
sovereignty of the nation effectively. They needed to focus on the 
mass approach and practical action and more attention to the 
professionalism in their own field. It was a development of political 
education agenda.26 
Democracy is a social process and also a learning one. The social 
control towards the decision-making which was quite often not 
inclined to justice was also time-consuming. To implement democracy 
shortcuts and romantic measures are not enough. The idea of 
revolution which is quite often talked in certain circle, particularly the 
radical young generation, did not offer the way-out of the ummah 
problems, because the problems were very complicated and needed to 
discern the importance of all socials forces to operationalize collective 
awareness. 
In this connection, it could be seen the role off intellectual 
organizations like KAHMI, ICMI or the other, to develop a positive 
interaction, in order to struggle for justice and even distribution which 
did not end with lip-service. Slogan and philanthropy programmes 
inclined to defend status-quo. Theoretically, there is no difference 
between philanthropy programmes and even distribution one. The gift 
of philanthropy programmes is to provide a social agenda, but it did 
not have impact on concrete economic structure. What has been 
expected by the society is even distribution programmes and has the 
impact on the productive asset of entrepreneurship.27  
The lessons were: First, the innate strength of economic 
globalization. The foreign debt should be utilized for the maximum 
benefit of people and their prosperity. Second, a tiny group of society 
                                                 
26 Komaruddin and  Fauzie, HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman, p. 154. 
27 Ibid., p. 157. 
  
Politicization of Indonesian Islam 
171 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 10, Number 02, December 2016 
could not develop the strength of economic foundation. The strength 
of the tiny group caused the collapse of national economy and disrupt 
its distribution. 
At the practical level, the above constructive suggestions were not 
implemented by the government so that the apprehensions appeared 
and raised a huge social unrest and deep economic crisis in the 
country. The deepening economic crisis was accompanied by a 
growing political crisis Soeharto was facing from the people who had 
slowly and painfully begun to recover from the terrible defeat of 1965. 
The first major sign of the revival of resistance came in 1974 when a 
million people spilled onto the streets during widespread student 
protests. Yet they were also brought together as workers, and as “the 
1980s progressed they began to use their collective strength to strike 
for better wages and working conditions with some success.”28  
By 1996 the dissatisfaction against the Soeharto regime was 
spreading up to sections of the ruling and middle classes, who were 
being excluded from the profit and corruption bonanza by Soeharto’s 
cronies. Protests at various levels were mounting throughout the 
country.  
In the beginning of 1960’s, some of Santri alumni entered 
universities and colleges. Seven years later, the booming of educated 
scholars from the Santri cultural background came into existence. After 
graduation, they became bureaucrats. Along with their career, for few 
years, they hid their Islamic identity and after they occupied an 
important position, they begun to “Islamize“ offices, departments, or 
campuses. The managers and leaders of the office held pengajian or 
teaching of Islamic doctrines and performed congregation prayers in 
the place where they worked. In this context, lecturers revived the 
religious activities in their campuses.29 
In order to resolve the deadlock, they constituted the Persami (The 
Indonesian Muslim Scholar Union) in 1964. While the New Order 
came into being, some of Muslim scholars headed by Subchan, Z.E, 
from NU element withdrew from the Persami, and established ISII 
(Ikatan Sarjana Islam Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim Scholar 
association) affiliated to the NU party. Unfortunately the two Muslim 
                                                 
28 See footnote No. 41. 
29 Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Islam Aktual, Refleksi-Sosial Seorang Cendekiawan Muslim 
(Bandung: Mizan, 1996), p. 101. 
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scholars associations never displayed their activities so that even many 
Muslim scholars did not know them. 
When Parmusi emerged on surface, a lot at Muslim scholars put 
their hope on it. Some of them joined the Sekber Golkar. Through the 
Golkar and Parmusi, Muslim intellectuals channelled their vertical 
mobility. In the 1970 the government restructured political parties and 
organizations on a large scale. The Islamic political parties were 
merged in one party. Islamic mass organizations were separated from 
political organization, and engaged in social activities. In 1985, the 
political renewal and consolidation reached its culmination with the 
enforcement of azas tunggal (sole basis) Pancasila. Since then, legally 
speaking there was no other Islamic party. In 1990 they established 
ICMI that was supported by the New Order government as a viable 
alternative to channel their socio-political activities. The vast majority 
of ummah initially welcomed it with respect. 
The birth of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) was expected to 
determine Indonesian Muslim history in the years to come. To fulfil 
the aspiration of the ummah in colouring the decision-making process, 
ICMI serves as the platform to aggregate the ideas of Muslim 
intellectuals. ICMI is a non-political movement, although it was bound 
to Islamic commitment. ICMI was not intended to revive 
primordialism. In Azyumardi Azra’s words, ICMI will become “brain-
trust” of the New Order government in the years to come.30 
In general, there were different approaches the Muslim leaders to 
the modern-challenges: legal, cultural, and social transformation. 
Legalistic approach aimed at revamping the existing order and society 
under the blue-print of Islamic legal, ritual and formalistic precept. 
Islamic doctrine and laws to became the sole standard of reference in 
all practices and affairs in the society. 
The cultural approach is aimed at distilling methods from Islamic 
teachings, which are capable of integrating non-religious sphere   
(secularist part) into a new totally Islamic framework of development.31 
To this end, ICMI suggests that modernity must be faced through 
efforts to develop institutions (banking, scientific enterprises, 
economic, politics, etc.) in line with the Islamic teachings. 
                                                 
30 Berita Buana, December 7, 1990. 
31 John Naisbitt, Megatrends Asia: The Eight Asia Megtrends that are Changing the World 
(London: Nicholas Brealey, 1996), pp. 103-240. 
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The transformation approach aimed at seeking solutions to the 
problems of modernity by avoiding exclusivist attitude both towards 
neo-orthodox and non-Islamic aspirations. It advocated accommo-
dative attitude and introduced disturbing questions related to the 
central doctrine of orthodoxy. Therefore the leading advocates of 
ICMI like H.M Soeharto and Prof. Dr. B.J Habibie would like to 
mould ICMI on the ideology of Pancasila, close to Indonesian culture, 
“Modern-Muslim”, and high quality Muslim. 
The leading Indonesian Muslim intellectuals like B.J. Habibie,32 
Nurcholish Madjid, Amin Rais, Quraish Shihab, Imaduddin, Ali Yafie, 
Abdurrahman Wahid and others have pursued this transformative 
strategy, advocating non-confrontational understanding of Islam and 
modernity, seeking open dialogue with other groups for reaching 
mutual understanding of problems faced by society in general, and 
encouraging the ummah to work together with others in resolving such 
pressing questions as massive poverty, abuses of human rights,33 the 
stagnation of democratization, etc. 
Although ICMI is not a political organization, its basic purpose 
and objective is political in nature. B.J. Habibie, the general chairman 
of ICMI, firmly rejects the notion that ICMI is a political organization, 
and insists that it does not belong to any political organization. It was 
established only to fight against ignorance and poverty among 
Muslims.34 
In line with B.J. Habibie’s statement, Soetjipto Wirosardjono and 
Nurcholish Madjid rejected the thinking of those activists of ICMI 
who exploited Islamic symbols for political purposes; including 
democratization and de-militarization, especially when they did not 
understand the meaning of religious symbol they manipulated.35 On 
the other side, Aswab Mahasin as a “non-active“ member of ICMI has 
expressed his worry that ICMI has become a “pseudo-political party“ 
and behaves like a “political machine.”36 For the same reason 
Nurcholish Madjid and Amin Rais had withdrawn their support from 
                                                 
32 See, “Otokritik Tahun Keempat, Silaturrahmi ICMI,” Gatra, No. 9 Tahun I, Jakarta 
(January 14, 1995), p. 36. 
33 Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance 
(London: IB Tauris, 1995), p. 36. 
34 Merdeka, December 8, 1992 and Merdeka, November 30, 1992. 
35 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, p. 95. 
36 Ibid., p. 94. 
  
Masykur Hakim 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 10, Number 02, December 2016 
174 
the organization in the years after its establishment, because they 
observed that ICMI was too political. 
In the context of ICMI, Adi Sasono argued that the key issues for 
ICMI are democratization and an eventual reduction in the military’s 
political role. The problem with ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik 
Indonesia, Indonesian military), he noted, is that it was worried about 
any challenge to position.37 Hence, it was understandable that ABRI 
expressed its displeasure over the birth of ICMI. Democratization is 
not the primary goal of many in ICMI, because the main objective of 
its activities is to empower the state in order to Islamize society and 
enact Islamic value based on law and regulations. Mokhtar Mas’oed, a 
political scientist at Gajah Mada University argues that Abdurrahman 
Wahid and the NU on the other hand “seeks to empower the people” 
and in so doing both Muslim, and non Muslim Indonesian will be 
empowered.”38  
In the years after Soeharto came to power, the ummah felt many 
obstacles in political field. Moh. Kamal Hassan in his treatise on 
Muslim intellectual response toward modernization of the New Order 
in Indonesia, pointed out in 1968 that Muslims and Islamic political 
party leaders realized the government considered that politically strong 
Islam will threaten Pancasila Democracy, the new political system of 
the New Order, although the regime did need legitimacy from Islam in 
order to make the PELITA (Five-Year Development) success.39 Even 
according to Deliar Noer, ex-national chairman of HMI (1953-1955 
period), the New Order government not merely opposed the Islamic 
political organizations, but also curbed their efforts which were related 
directly to the religious issues. For instance, the government ever 
prohibited the ummah to hold a congress in 1968, and monopolized the 
management of pilgrims to Mecca in the same year, eliminated school 
holidays in the month of fasting (Ramadhan) and reduced all facilities 
needed by the ummah in commerce. The government introduced a 
draft marriage bill, which was regarded offensive to Islam.40 
                                                 
37 Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
38 Ibid., pp. 110-111. 
39 Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to “new order” Modernization, p. 44. 
40 Deliar Noer, “Islam a Political Force in Indonesian,” in J. J. Fox et al, (eds), Indonesia: 
Australia Perspectives (Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 1980), pp. 
642-3. 
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In other words, it was obvious that the government needed Islam 
when it supported the government and gave it legitimacy. Once the 
government supported establishment of Parmusi, for instance, it 
resulted in the undermining of PNI. On the contrary, the government 
obstructed all activities perceived as threatening the government 
power; for instance, the proposal of Mohammad Hatta, the former 
vice President, to establish PDII (Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia) 
was not agreed by the government. Even the creation Parmusi, 
according to Samson, did not benefit the Muslim modern group in 
Indonesia. One of the weaknesses of the party was its failure to receive 
recognition as a legal and influential political force, namely possessing 
the political power in proportion to the number of its followers.41 
Several repressive policies which had negative impact for future of 
Islam are more obvious in the 1980’s. According to Vatikiotis, the 
government succeeded in destroying Islamic parties, with the religious 
politics of the New Order which emphasized harmony, whereas the 
Muslim community felt it was political chaos.42 The Islamic political 
forces had indeed declined. 
In the period between 1970-1986, which, in terms of the process 
of the de-politization of Islam might be called the “period of 
exorcising“, the regime began to exercise a formal way to depoliticize 
Islam by activating national laws obligating all political parties and 
mass organization to subscribe to the Pancasila as the sole foundation. 
While the NU decided to replace its Islamic foundation with the 
Pancasila at its congress in 1984 when the draft law was under 
discussion in the DPR, Muhammadiyah and HMI chose to wait until 
the draft was legislated. 
The Politicization of Islam and the Fall of Soeharto Regime 
Many Muslim leaders were concerned that the process of 
Pancasilaization would mean deislamization.43 For them, Muslims’ 
acceptance to Pancasila as a national consensus should not be 
understood as a theological statement, but only as a political one. They 
                                                 
41 A. A. Samson, “Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic 
Modernism,” in R. William Liddle (ed.), Political Participation in Modern Indonesia, 
Monograph series No. 19 (Yale University Southeast Asia studies), p. 116. 
42 M. R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for 
Change (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 120. 
43 Ibid. 
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referred to President Soeharto’s statement of 1982 that Pancasila 
would not become a religion and the religion would not be Pancasila.  
There is a group within the Muslim community responded to the 
political process in a more reactionary way.44 The emergence of this 
group, which might be labelled as fundamentalist, was a result of an 
internal dynamic within the Muslim community aimed at protecting 
Islam and Muslims from the impact of the ongoing political process. 
The majority of Indonesian Muslims did not support this group. This 
is understandable because the nature of Indonesian Islam which, 
following the line of Indonesian culture, is devoted to moderation, 
tolerance and harmony. Beside this the situational logic of politics, 
which has created fear and to some extent apathy, within the society 
would encourage Muslim cadres to initiate political change by 
attempting to seek justification from Islam. 
The Indonesian Muslim intellectual has tried to give answers to the 
social problems faced by the Muslim community. The answers resulted 
from two coincidental factors; the real condition of the Muslim 
community stemming from its struggle in seeking the adequate 
relationship between Islam and Indonesian culture, and the emergence 
of a new educated Muslim generation. The majority of leaders of the 
new generation are dissatisfied with the ways of old generation who 
had been attempting to sidetrack the problems and the condition of 
the Muslim community. 
The launching of asas tunggal Pancasila by the government initially 
received strong reaction from Muslim community of the country. The 
culmination of the reaction was a riot in Tanjung Priok, the Jakarta 
Harbour area in August 1984, in which hundreds of Muslim died at the 
hands of the Indonesian army and several prominent figures were 
arrested, including two members of the petition 50 group; A.M Fatwa 
and (Lt. Gen. Ret.) H.R. Darsono. The former was a famous Muslim 
preacher and the latter was a famous former commander in Chief the 
west Java based Siliwangi Division of the Armed Forces. This incident 
was followed by a series of incidents during the year 1984-1985 that 
threatened the stability of the governance, such as the explosion at 
Bank Central Asia (BCA) in Jakarta, the Borobudur Buddhist Temple 
in Yogyakarta, and the Marine Base in Cilandak, Jakarta. A Muslim 
group was accused of responsibility for the first two explosions. For 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
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many, these incidents were not unconnected to each other, and were 
reactions to the regime’s political engineering programmes, which 
showed the tendency to centralize and accumulate power. 
The above issues presented a negative image of Islam to the young 
generation during the New Order era, and also forced their alienation 
from the government. To this stage, the ummah faced a dilemma. If 
they were close to the government, it was contrary to the real 
condition. If they remained away from the government, it would 
benefit the anti-Islam groups, particularly Christians. M. Amin Rais 
saw the former indication. According to that Indonesia is a centre of 
Christian activities for “Christianization” of the ummah through five 
strategic steps, namely education, mass media, economic assistance, 
marriage relationship and political power.45  
The condition was worse as the growth of corruption in the 
country under Soeharto regime had become so rampant. But it can 
hardly be avoided in a discussion of national level openly and 
transparently. While for long time, corruption was the whip with which 
neo-liberals would beat opponents of liberalization, now it is becoming 
increasingly obvious that there is a close correspondence between 
liberalization and the scale of corruption. This indeed is now 
recognized as a global problem.46 The corruption adds to the myopia 
of private investment decisions, since the commitments and contracts 
won through corruption are even more vulnerable to political 
instability. While the number of unemployed is more increasing and 
dismissal of workers in big factories occurred almost every day and it 
was quite vulnerable to the social unrest on large scale. 
The people’s frustrations reached culmination as the university 
students throughout the country voiced their suffering via a huge 
demonstration demanding of President Soeharto to step down 
immediately. It was on 21 May 1998, the downfall of Soeharto paved 
the way to Prof. B.J. Habibie as Vice President to become the third 
Indonesian President. Unfortunately, the downfall of Soeharto did not 
mark a complete break with the past. President Habibie has performed 
                                                 
45 M. Amien Rais, “Gerakan Kristian di Asia Tenggara: Kasus Indonesia”, Working paper on 
seminar of Isu-isu Dakwah Kontemporer dan Cabaran Abad ke 21, in Marang, 
Trengganu, Malaysia, September 1994 
46 See “The Symposium on Corruption: Constraints,” in B. Plescovic and JE. Stiglitz 
(eds), Annual World Bank Conference on Economic Development 1997 (The World Bank, 
1998). See in particular the article by Susan-Acherman. 
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better than feared as he has tried to institute changes (such as the 
election), but re remains a Soeharto appointee in his policies. The 
corruption of the Soeharto years has been white-washed rather than 
investigated.47  
While politicians and academicians in Jakarta are preoccupied with 
political and economic reform, the concern in rural areas is much more 
down to earth. In the fast few weeks, demonstrations have broken out 
in at least 50 districts (called regencies in Indonesia) from Sumatera to 
Nusa Tenggara. Many of the protests are related to disputed land 
ownership. All fall into the category of what Indonesians call KKN 
(Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme)48 which is fuelling public demands for a 
full investigation of the Soeharto family’s wealth. Once Habibie noted 
that “they are like people who have not had oxygen for 32 years”.49 In 
brief it can be said that the collapse of Soeharto regime is the logical 
consequences of his politicization of Islam that not sided its ummah in 
its real meaning and not for the prosperity of Indonesian people.  
Conclusion 
In the later political development it was found that the role of 
government and the ABRI was very dominant, and on the other hand, 
the role of political parties had been emasculated, particularly after the 
policy of restructuring political parties and enforcement of asas tunggal 
in post 1985 period. In such a condition, many Muslim intellectuals 
established NGOs and put their efforts in bringing about social 
transformation to the ummah. Figures like Abdurrahman Wahid, 
Nurcholish Madjid, Adi Sasono, Dawam Rahardjo, Tawang Alun and 
others were actively involved in these institutions and they were ready 
to welcome Indonesia’s reform era as the Soeharto goverment was 
toppled down in 1998.[] 
                                                 
47 The Times of India, May 10, 1999. 
48 KKN is the local abbreviation for corruption, collusion and nepotism. 
49 “Politics & Policy,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25 (1998), p. 21.  
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